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Cohen: Trade Associations in Law and Business
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
that they do so. Yet when circumstances permitted they were not
unwilling to hide behind Woodrow Wilson's coat tails in denying
that the Treaty of London was any longer applicable. This book
will do much to help place Italian policy at the Versailles Conference in its true light. In doing so it will also shed some new
light upon Allied policy and will aid in explaining the strained
relations between Italy and Great Britain and France since that
time. Even though the recent Munich Pact was not an Italian victory in any sense Mussolini must have received some pleasure out
of the fact that Great Britain and France found themselves in an
awkward position before Hitler and were compelled to accept a
loser's terms.
An important feature of this volume is the more than two
hundred pages of pertinent documents covering the period from
1915 to 1919. There are also an adequate bibliography and an excellent index.
CARL M. FRAsuRE.
West Virginia University,
Morgantown, West Virginia.
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In 1912, one year after the Supreme Court distilled the "rule
of reason" out of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, A. J. Eddy
presented a forceful apologia for "cooperative competition,' a
term used to describe the trade association device which he sponsored. This year another apologia has appeared in print. Needless to say the sledding is much easier. The authors have behind
them the fruition of a long struggle in which the courts have already carved out a comfortable niche for the trade association.
The present work, however, is a theme on a variation from Eddy's.
Whereas Eddy sought to provide an impetus for an incipient trade
association movement, Messrs. Kirsch and Shapiro face a matured
system in an attempt to demarcate what is economically desirable
and legal from what is economically undesirable and illegal.
On the economic level, the tone of the book is Brandeisian. The
authors sponsor an intelligent cooperation on the part of competitors, a cooperation which offers the advantages of large scale
1 EDDY,

THE NEw Co fPrriTION (1912).
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BOOK REVIEVS
consolidation and yet preserves individual initiative and indepenThus the view that such trade association activities as
dence.
statistical reporting, uniform cost accounting, standardization of
products, credit bureau functions, etc., offer benefits not only to
competitors, but to the public as well.
The course of judicial decisions which they plot presents a
somewhat familiar picture - broadly, that when the trade association serves as a medium for the making of agreements to curtail
production, regulate price, and apportion profits in order to control the market, it will meet the restraining force of the Sherman
Act. They find little logic, however, in the court's reluctance to
employ the "rule of reason" in determining the legality of price
fixing by trade associations, especially in view of its use in the
merger cases, in which the control of price has been achieved by
centralized ownership. They view with critical despair the ability
of a recalcitrant minority to cling to the protection of the AntiTrust Acts when a majority in a trade association seek to rid an
industry of uneconomic practices. Perhaps the Supreme Court's
venture into the realm of realistic market economics in the Appalaclhian case 3 will revive the hopes of the authors.
A word about the organization of the material. Chapters II
to VI contain discussions of the activities of trade associations
which, in the main, are sanctioned by the Anti-Trust Acts, e.g.,
statistical reporting, uniform cost accounting, trade relations,
standardization of commodities, credit bureau functions, etc. It
is in the chapters headed "Boycotts and Defensive Combinations",
"Uniform Basing Point Systems of Trade Associations" and "Collective Purchasing Functions of Trade Associations" that one feels
the impact of the Anti-Trust Acts, for basically, they are linked
closer to the problem of market control. In the chapter on "Patent
Interchange", the authors describe the apparent inconsistency of
two fundamental policies - the policy of monopoly sponsored by
the patent statutes, and the policy of "free" competition sponsored
by the Anti-Trust Acts. To them, a patent interchange is "nothing
more than a scientific and intelligent co-operation of creative or inventive thought, much akin to a bureau for scientific research."
The last chapter on "Foreign Trade Functions of Trade Associ2 For a similar view, see the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 S. Ct. 114, 66 L. Ed.

284 (1921).

3Appalachian

Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471, 77

L. Ed. 825 (1933).
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ations" emphasizes the need for exempting groups of exporters
from the Anti-Trust Acts in order to compete with industrial and
commercial combinations abroad.
Surprisingly lacking in this otherwise able presentation is a
consideration of the consumer's position in the light of trade association activities. The authors have written only a sentence' on the
possibility of monopolistic competition in a market dominated by
a few. The theory that a monopolistic position detrimental to the
consumer may be reached in the market, even in the absence of
agreements condemned by the Anti-Trust Acts, has been widely
accepted by economists. Surely, it would have been in order to
consider this phenomenon in weighing the merits and the demerits
of the trade association device.
JULIUs COHEN.
West Virginia University,
Morgantown, West Virginia.
4P. 41.
G See, for example, CHAMBERLIN, THE THfEORY OF MONOPOLISTJC COMSPETITION
(1933);

(1936); ROBIDSON, THE EcONOMICs OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION
Mason, Monopoly inLaw and Economics (1937) 47 YAT.E L. J. 34.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1939

3

